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1515 
MR. EMANUEL RETURNS FROM WASHINGTON: 
DURATIONAL RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS 
AND ELECTION LITIGATION 
In the heat of the 2011 Chicago mayoral campaign, an appellate court 
in Illinois ordered the name of front-runner Rahm Emanuel, a former 
congressman and White House Chief of Staff, stricken from the ballot 
based on its determination that Emanuel had not been a Chicago resident 
for the one year preceding election day. The election was thrown into 
turmoil less than a month before voters were to go to the polls to elect the 
successor to the long-serving Mayor Richard M. Daley. The decision 
ignited a firestorm of condemnation that was fueled in part by a vigorous 
and visceral dissenting opinion as well as the appellate court‘s decision to 
not certify an appeal. Two days later, the Illinois Supreme Court ended the 
uproar by reversing the appellate court in Maksym v. Board of Election 
Commissioners,
1
 turning the campaign‘s focus back to the candidates but 
issuing a legally questionable opinion in the process.  
The case of Rahm Emanuel is one of the most high profile examples of 
candidates who face removal from the ballot based on durational residence 
requirements, laws specifying that candidates must have been residents of 
the electoral unit for a length of time before their election. In an era of 
increasing mobility, durational residence requirements can prove 
particularly onerous for potential candidates wishing to return ―home‖ in 
order to run for political office. Moreover, as the story of Maksym amply 
illustrates, durational residence challenges force courts to resolve a tension 
between the rule of law and a preference for voter choice in a politically 
charged atmosphere within a much shorter timeframe than appellate courts 
traditionally are given to consider difficult questions. By requiring courts 
to make such difficult choices so quickly, durational residence 
requirements risk the legitimacy of courts on an issue that arguably should 
be resolved by the electorate itself. 
Part I of this note discusses durational residence requirements, focusing 
on the elements of durational residence and the policies that animate them. 
Part II discusses Maksym v. Board of Election Commissioners, the Rahm 
Emanuel residence case, analyzing and critiquing the opinions of both the 
appellate court and state supreme court. Part III examines lessons that can 
be drawn from Maksym, and in particular the difficulties this class of cases 
poses for courts, the impulse of courts to resolve legal questions in the 
 
 
 1. 950 N.E.2d 1051 (Ill. 2011). 
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interest of promoting voter choice, and ways in which a court confronted 
with a similar issue in the future could deal with it. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF DURATIONAL RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS 
Durational residence requirements are neither new nor unique. The 
Constitution has a durational residence requirement for the President,
2
 as 
well as durational national citizenship requirements for Congressmen.
3
 
Many states impose some form of durational residence requirement for at 
least some elected state officials, including governors,
4
 legislators,
5
 
judges,
6
 and mayors.
7
 The proliferation of state requirements results in 
several different interpretations of what constitutes residence, which is 
again substantially confused by the interchangeable use of the terms 
―residence‖ and ―domicile‖ in some jurisdictions. It is impossible to 
articulate a single definition of residence that applies universally. 
Durational residence requirements can serve several legitimate 
purposes. They give voters and candidates the opportunity to become 
familiar with one another. Voters may be interested in knowing ―the 
candidate‘s ability, character, personality, and reputation,‖8 or ―the . . . 
experience[] and views of the individuals who seek to represent them.‖9 
Voters have an interest in ―apprais[ing] those who seek to be candidates 
for a key . . . office that touches important events and relationships of their 
lives and of the community in which they live. There are innumerable 
qualities and qualifications that are relevant.‖10 
 
 
 2. Only those who have ―been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States‖ are eligible 
to be President. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. The author is aware of no case that interprets the 
constitutional meaning of ―Resident.‖ 
 3. Representatives must have ―been seven Years a Citizen of the United States.‖ U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Senators must have ―been nine Years a Citizen of the United States.‖ U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 3, cl. 3. 
 4. E.g., KY. CONST. § 72; MO. CONST. art. IV, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 2; OR. CONST. at. V, 
§ 2. 
 5. E.g., KY. CONST. § 32; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 4, 6; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 7; OR. CONST. 
art. IV, § 8(1). 
 6. E.g., KY. CONST. § 122; MO. CONST. art. V, § 21.  
 7. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 83A.040(1); MO. REV. STAT. § 77.230. 
 8. Hatcher v. Bell, 521 S.W.2d 799, 803 04 (Tenn. 1974) (upholding five-year residence 
requirement for an elected circuit judge against equal protection challenge); see also Mobley v. 
Armstrong, 978 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Ky. 1998) (―The [durational residence] requirement also enables the 
people of the district to gain knowledge about the candidate‘s abilities and character.‖); State ex rel. 
Brown v. Summit Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 545 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (Ohio 1989) (quoting Hatcher with 
approval). 
 9. Cox v. Barber, 568 S.E.2d 478, 481 (Ga. 2002) (upholding one-year residence requirement 
for state commission). 
 10. Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107, 120 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (upholding durational residence 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/6
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Durational residence requirements may also ―ensure that governmental 
officials are sufficiently connected to their constituents to serve them with 
sensitivity and understanding.‖11 They act to assure the electorate that 
―their elected representatives will have at least a minimum amount of ties 
to the community.‖12 Further, ―[r]equiring candidates to live in a district 
for a reasonable period of time before the election encourages them to 
become familiar with the problems, needs, and concerns of the people they 
seek to represent.‖13 This affords candidates ―the opportunity to know the 
customs and the mores of the people.‖14 Durational residence requirements 
also guard against ―precinct shopping,‖ the practice of candidates 
changing residences in order to find favorable electoral districts.
15
 
There is no single definition of ―residence‖ for election purposes. Each 
state possesses the power to set voter and candidate qualifications 
consistently with the Constitution,
16
 and, as a consequence, each state can 
define and interpret its durational residence requirements differently. 
However, three related concepts are frequently used to determine a 
candidate‘s residence: domicile, habitation, and the existence of a physical 
dwelling place. 
The first concept that often informs the definition of residence is 
domicile. Unlike the other two concepts, domicile has a settled legal 
meaning, one that is usually consistent from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. At 
birth, one acquires a domicile of origin, generally that of one of his or her 
parents.
17
 Under certain circumstances thereafter, such as a change of 
domicile by the parents of a minor, one‘s domicile can change by 
 
 
requirements for judicial candidates). 
 11. Lewis v. Gibbons, 80 S.W.3d 461, 466 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 12. Cox, 568 S.E.2d at 481. 
 13. Id.; see also Mobley, 978 S.W.2d at 310 (―The state has an interest in ensuring that a judge is 
familiar with the problems and needs of the people in his district.‖). 
 14. Hatcher v. Bell, 521 S.W.2d 799, 804 (Tenn. 1974). 
 15. Farnsworth v. Jones, 441 S.E.2d 597, 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (―The [durational residence] 
requirement was designed to deter abuses of the election process, such as precinct shopping, and to 
ensure that elected officials sincerely represent the residents of a particular district.‖). 
 16. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 140 41 (1972) (―Although we have emphasized 
on numerous occasions the breadth of power enjoyed by the States in determining voter qualifications 
and the manner of elections, this power must be exercised in a manner consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖). The constitutional limits on voter qualifications 
are more stringent than the limits on candidate qualifications. Compare Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. 
Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973) (three-judge panel) (upholding seven-year durational residence requirement 
for state governor), summarily aff’d, 414 U.S. 802 (1973), with Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 
(1972) (invalidating one-year state durational residence requirement and three-month county 
durational residence requirement). 
 17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14 (1971); Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1518 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1515 
 
 
 
 
operation of law.
18
 Upon attaining adulthood, one can acquire a new 
domicile of choice through a union of physical presence in a new location 
and an intention to make that place one‘s home.19 Once established, a 
domicile continues until superseded by a new one,
20
 and a person has one 
and only one domicile at any given time.
21
 
Domicile measures the place a person subjectively but reasonably 
considers to be ―home,‖ irrespective of whether he or she actually lives 
there. It is ―a person‘s true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to 
which that person intends to return and remain even though currently 
residing elsewhere.‖22 Because one‘s extant domicile can under most 
circumstances only be changed through a person‘s intention to acquire a 
new domicile, a person never intending to make a permanent home 
elsewhere never loses his or her original domicile, in spite of absence from 
a jurisdiction that can stretch for years at a time. Domicile thus reflects a 
person‘s psychological connection with their home jurisdiction, a belief 
that such place is ―home.‖ Moreover, the rules governing domicile ensure 
that this belief is reasonable by prohibiting people from acquiring new 
domiciles of choice from afar and preventing maintenance of an old 
domicile where a person intends to make a home in a new location. 
Domicile can be analogized to state citizenship.
23
 It is meant to reflect a 
permanent home, thereby excluding transient foreigners who live in a 
locality temporarily but intend to return to their own homes, such as 
students and persons on temporary work assignment. A durational 
residence requirement that incorporates domicile thus ensures that voters 
have a permanent relationship with their locality. 
The second concept is habitation, which denotes the location where a 
person can be said to actually live on a day-to-day basis. It requires only 
―an intention to live in a place for the time being.‖24 This place could be 
virtually anything: a house, an apartment, a hotel room, a mobile home, or 
even automobile. Habitation thus reflects where a person actually lives, 
not where their home is. A college student living in a dormitory, for 
 
 
 18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 21 23 & cmt. (1971). 
 19. Id. §§ 15 18; Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 48. 
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19 (1971). 
 21. Id. § 11(2). 
 22. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 558 (9th ed. 2009) (defining domicile). 
 23. Indeed, in the case of diversity jurisdiction, domicile is the equivalent of state citizenship 
under federal law. E.g., Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624 (1914).  
 24. Perri v. Kisselbach, 167 A.2d 377, 379 (N.J. 1961). Perri refers to this concept as 
―residence,‖ but since the purpose of this portion of the Note would be frustrated by so denoting it, I 
have chosen a different term. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/6
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example, would inhabit the town where the dormitory is physically 
located, despite being domiciled elsewhere. 
The third concept is that of a dwelling place or a physical living 
space—a house, condominium, apartment, or other living quarters that one 
can or does call home.
25
 In the context of a candidate residence 
requirement, this usually means that the candidate must maintain some 
form of residential space—for example, an owned home or rented 
apartment—within the jurisdiction. Unlike domicile, it is possible for a 
person to have more than one dwelling place.
26
 Further, a dwelling is 
different from domicile in that it is focused on where a person is able to 
live—including dwellings used infrequently, if at all—rather than where 
he or she considers to be the permanent and fixed home.
27
 
These three concepts are used in varying combinations by courts to test 
for residence within the differing meanings of state election codes. In 
some states, residence and domicile are equivalent (the pure domicile 
test),
28
 and so a candidate domiciled for the requisite period meets the 
durational residence requirement.
29
 Other states have more stringent 
requirements. Under the actual residence test, a candidate need not only 
be domiciled within the election jurisdiction for the requisite period, but 
must also maintain habitation there.
30
 Other jurisdictions vary the mix.  
II. MAKSYM V. BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS:  
THE RAHM EMANUEL CASE 
A. Durational Residence Requirements in Illinois 
Illinois has required durational residence for public officials since the 
Illinois Constitution of 1818.
31
 Durational residence requirements have 
 
 
 25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 12 (1971) (using the phrase ―place 
where a person dwells‖ to define the concept of home). 
 26. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Sullivan, 205 S.W.3d 168, 170 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (―[A] person can 
have several residences at one time . . . .‖). 
 27. See Dietz v. City of Medora, 333 N.W.2d 702, 704 (N.D. 1983) (distinguishing between a 
candidate‘s ―actual residence‖ (dwellings) and ―legal residence‖ (domicile)). 
 28. See S. Chad Meredith, Note, Look Homeward Candidate: Evaluating and Reforming 
Kentucky’s Residency Definition and Bona Fides Challenges in Order to Avoid a Potential Crisis in 
Gubernatorial Elections, 95 KY. L.J. 211, 218 (2007). 
 29. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Jones, 441 S.E.2d 597, 601–02 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Hatcher v. 
Bell, 521 S.W.2d 799, 803–04 (Tenn. 1974). 
 30. E.g., Mobley v. Armstrong, 978 S.W.2d 307, 310–11 (Ky. 1998); Chachas v. Miller, 83 P.3d 
827, 829–31 (Nev. 2004). 
 31. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 3 (one-year durational residence requirement for legislators); 
id. art. III, § 3 (two-year durational residence requirement for governor); id. art. III, § 13 (two-year 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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been maintained for constitutional offices ever since.
32
 In addition to 
constitutional requirements, Illinois statutory law contains additional 
durational residence requirements. Pertinent to a discussion of the 
Emanuel case is the statutory durational residence requirement for 
municipal officers. The office of mayor has historically required that the 
mayor be a qualified elector,
33
 which in turn required that a person be a 
resident of his or her voting district during the thirty days preceding the 
election.
34
 As of 2011, the Illinois Municipal Code imposed a one-year 
durational residence requirement for mayors.
35
 Under a succession of 
statutes dating back to the nineteenth century, ―permanent abode‖ has been 
―necessary to constitute a residence‖ for the purposes of voter 
qualification.
36
 The Illinois courts interpret this statute to mean that 
―residence‖ and ―permanent abode‖ are synonymous terms.37 
The earliest Illinois Supreme Court case involving the durational 
residence requirement was Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie,
38
 which 
involved a challenge to the eligibility of a recently elected local judge 
under the constitutional durational residence requirement. Prior to 
ascending the bench, the judge—then a lawyer—had rented out his Illinois 
home and moved to Tennessee as an ―experiment.‖39 He declined to sell 
his Illinois law books before moving and refused to vote in Tennessee 
elections upon arrival, so as to maintain his Illinois citizenship.
40
 Finding 
Tennessee not to his liking after two months, he soon returned to Illinois.
41
 
Holding that residence can be lost only ―by a union of intention and acts,‖ 
 
 
durational residence requirement for lieutenant governor). 
 32. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(c) (two-year durational residence requirement for legislators); id. 
art. V, § 3, (three-year durational residence requirement for governor, lieutenant governor, attorney 
general, secretary of state, comptroller, and treasurer); see also ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 3 (two-
year durational residence requirement for legislators); id. art. V, § 5 (five-year durational residence 
requirement for governor and lieutenant governor); id. art. VI, § 3 (five-year durational residence 
requirement for supreme court judges).  
 33. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 14 (1897). 
 34. See id. ch. 46, § 65. 
 35. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3.1-10-5(a) (West 2012). 
 36. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 66 (1897), with 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3-2(a) 
(West 2010) (both using the same quoted language). 
 37. E.g., Bullman v. Cooper, 200 N.E. 173, 177 (Ill. 1936) (citing Johnson v. People, 94 Ill. 505 
(1880)). Johnson relied on Spragins v. Houghton, 3 Ill. (1 Scam.) 377 (1840), which laid down a rule 
that ―[e]very man is a resident who has taken up his permanent abode in the State.‖ Id. at 416. It is 
worth noting that Spragins embraced the notion that residence and domicile are different things. See 
id. (citing Brown v. Keene, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 112 (1834) for the proposition that ―the word ‗resident‘ 
does not mean a citizen‖). 
 38. 44 Ill. 16 (1867). 
 39. Id. at 24. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/6
  
 
 
 
 
2013] MR. EMANUEL RETURNS FROM WASHINGTON 1521 
 
 
 
 
the test ordinarily used for domicile, the court found that the judge had 
never ceased to be an Illinois resident.
42
  
Twelve years later, the court had occasion to address the statutory 
question for the first time in Dale v. Irwin.
43
 In litigation over the results of 
a very close election for a town judgeship, the eligibility of several voters 
came into question, including students of a local college.
44
 In resolving 
which students were eligible, the court was required to decipher the 
meaning of the statutory command that ―a permanent abode is necessary to 
constitute a residence.‖45 It determined that ―a permanent abode, in the 
sense of the statute, means nothing more than a domcil, a home, which the 
party is at liberty to leave, as interest or whim may dictate, but without any 
present intention to change it.‖46 Students who were subject to local 
taxation, jury duty, and militia service were unquestionably residents of 
the town, as were students who were ―free from parental control‖ and had 
―no other [home] to which to return in case of sickness or domestic 
affliction.‖47 Students ―who have nothing to attach them to the town in 
which the college is situate [sic],‖ on the other hand, could not be 
considered residents.
48
 The court rejected an argument that students who 
had been subject to a local ―road tax‖ (actually a labor requirement) were 
eligible voters because all town inhabitants—as distinguished from 
residents—were subject to the road tax.49 
Although the Dale court explicitly equated ―permanent abode‖ with 
―domicile,‖ and even spoke the language of domicile by referring to an 
absence of ―any present intention to change‖ residence,50 it was not called 
on to determine whether a physical dwelling space was an element of 
residence in Illinois. With all of the students presumably using local 
housing stock while at school, whether these students were residents of the 
town turned on whether they were domiciled there or elsewhere. Similar 
cases involving college students thereafter consistently applied Dale, 
distinguishing between students who return to their parents‘ home during 
 
 
 42. Id. at 25. A dissenting judge would have upheld the challenge because he believed that the 
judge had been a Tennessee resident during his time there. Id. (Breese, J., dissenting). 
 43. 78 Ill. 170 (1875). 
 44. Id. at 181. 
 45. Id. (citing 46 ILL. REV. STAT. § 66, at 460 (1874)). 
 46. Id. at 181 82. 
 47. Id. at 182. 
 48. Id. The court believed that most students would fall into this category: ―As a general fact, . . . 
undergraduates of colleges are no more identified with residents of the town in which they are 
pursuing their studies, than the merest strangers . . . .‖ Id. 
 49. Id. at 183. 
 50. Id. at 182.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1522 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1515 
 
 
 
 
school breaks and ―in case of sickness or affliction,‖ and those who had no 
such connection to another place and therefore could be considered 
residents of the college town.
51
 Dale thus stands for the proposition that 
domicile is an element of residence within the meaning of the Illinois 
election statutes.  
The first case to draw a distinction between domicile and residence in 
the context of Illinois election law was Dorsey v. Brigham,
52
 a post-
election contest of a school board election in Livingston County.
53
 One of 
the issues in Dorsey was the eligibility of a voter, Mrs. Greenstone, whose 
husband had moved from Chicago before the cut-off date for durational 
residence, but who herself had only moved after the cut-off date.
54
 Under 
the operation of then-existing law, Mrs. Greenstone‘s domicile was 
identical to her husband‘s, and indeed had changed to Livingston County 
when her husband had moved.
55
 This did not end the court‘s inquiry 
because residence and domicile were not always the same.
56
 Instead, the 
court sought to determine when Mrs. Greenstone had acquired a 
permanent abode in Livingston County.
57
 Citing a legal dictionary, the 
court defined ―abode‖ as ―the place where a person dwells,‖ which could 
not logically be a place where a person had never been.
58
 As Mrs. 
Greenstone had not been to Livingston County before the cutoff date, she 
could not have resided there for the statutory period, and therefore was not 
an eligible voter.
59
 Thus, despite possessing a Livingston County domicile 
throughout the statutory period, Mrs. Greenstone was held to have resided 
elsewhere until she physically relocated. 
In Pope v. Board of Election Commissioners
60
 and Park v. Hood,
61
 the 
Illinois Supreme Court further elaborated on the difference between 
domicile and residence. Pope involved a lawyer who practiced in East St. 
Louis.
62
 For many years, the lawyer and his wife lived in East St. Louis 
 
 
 51. Anderson v. Pifer, 146 N.E. 171, 173 (Ill. 1924); see also Welch v. Shumway, 83 N.E. 549, 
562 63 (Ill. 1907); People ex rel. Madigan v. Baumgartner, 823 N.E.2d 1144, 1150 (Ill. App. 2005). 
 52. 52 N.E. 303 (Ill. 1898); see also Welch, 83 N.E. at 558 59 (Ill. 1907) (recognizing the shift 
from Dale‘s rule of domicile to Dorsey‘s observation that domicile and residence were not 
synonymous). 
 53. Dorsey, 52 N.E. at 304. 
 54. Id. at 307–08. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 307 (citing 46 REV. STAT. ILL. § 66 (year unknown)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 307 08. 
 60. 18 N.E.2d 214 (Ill. 1938). 
 61. 27 N.E.2d 838 (Ill. 1940). 
 62. Pope, 18 N.E.2d at 215. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/6
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but left for warmer climes during the winter on account of the wife‘s 
health.
63
 Due to repeated thefts during these winter absences, the lawyer 
and his wife shuttered their home, had their belongings stored, and took to 
living in hotels on month-to-month leases across the river in St. Louis 
during the summer months.
64
 The lawyer continued to vote in East St. 
Louis but changed his voter registration address to his law office.
65
 When 
his office moved, the county election board denied the lawyer‘s attempt to 
change his registration to the new office, so he sued in county court to 
compel the board to accept his new registration.
66
 Finding that he was not 
a resident of the precinct in East St. Louis where his office was located, 
the county court denied his petition.
67
 
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the election board had 
properly denied the lawyer‘s registration.68 It rejected the lawyer‘s 
argument that he was entitled to vote in East St. Louis by virtue of his 
domicile because ―it is elemental that domicile and residence are not 
synonymous.‖69 Instead, drawing on definitions from a variety of sources, 
the court determined that ―[a] real and not an imaginary abode occupied as 
[a] home or dwelling is essential to satisfy the residence requirements of 
the law.‖70 As the lawyer lacked a ―place of residence . . . which he ever 
occupied as an abode or to which he intend[ed] to return and occupy as a 
dwelling‖ in the precinct for which he wished to register, he was not 
eligible to register to vote there.
71
 
Two years later, the importance of a physical dwelling space was again 
emphasized in Park v. Hood.
72
 After an election in Frederick Township 
produced a one-vote margin of victory, the eligibility of several voters 
who lived outside of the township was challenged.
73
 In sorting out which 
voters were eligible, the court repeatedly relied on the availability of a 
physical dwelling within the township.
74
 Those who owned dwellings in 
the township and intended to return to those dwellings at some point in the 
 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. It is implied in the opinion, but not expressly stated, that his law office was located in a 
voting precinct different from his shuttered home. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 217. 
 69. Id. (citing 1 BENJAMIN W. POPE, LEGAL DEFINITIONS 405 (1919)). 
 70. Id. at 216. 
 71. Id. at 217. 
 72. 27 N.E.2d 838 (Ill. 1940). 
 73. Id. at 840–41. 
 74. The court looked to the two now-familiar residence statutes. See Park, 27 N.E.2d at 842 
(citing 46 ILL. REV. STAT. §§ 65–66 (1939)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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future were eligible; those who merely intended to return to the township 
without owning a physical dwelling were not.
75
 Park thus appeared to hold 
that one must have a physical dwelling available in a locality in order to be 
considered a resident of that locality. 
Between Park and Maksym, the Illinois Supreme Court dealt with 
residence challenges on multiple occasions, further clarifying that ―a voter 
must show a place of residence . . . which he has not abandoned but 
occupies as an abode, or to which he intends to return.‖76 Faced with 
varying facts, the Supreme Court of Illinois repeatedly held that residence 
was not established or had been lost. A man who had permitted adult 
children and their families to occupy his Illinois home while he himself 
moved to new homes in Missouri lost his residence in Illinois.
77
 A couple 
living in Indiana who had been deeded an Illinois farm lacked a permanent 
abode at the farm.
78
 A woman separated from her Illinois-resident husband 
but registered to vote in Indiana could not vote in Illinois, though 
domiciled there by operation of law.
79
 A voter who had previously lived at 
a farm that she still owned could not vote based on that farm because she 
had made a new home elsewhere.
80
 A voter who had moved to Indiana 
(and testified that his home was there) but intended to return to his former 
home in Illinois should he lose his job lost his Illinois residence.
81
 A 
 
 
 75. When referring to those who were held to reside in the jurisdiction, the court strongly 
emphasized the availability of a dwelling place: ―Mabel Adkinson not only made arrangements to live 
in Frederick, if circumstances permitted, but through the hospitality of her brother she and her small 
children did actually occupy his home from time to time.‖ Id. Similarly, when discussing persons who 
were not eligible to vote, the court noted their lack of a physical dwelling to which they could 
conceivably return:  
[N]ot one of the six voters challenged by the appellee had an actual place of abode of any 
kind or description in Frederick township on the day of the election. It is true that some of 
these persons expressed an intention of returning to Frederick. The fact remains that on April 
4, 1939, even though they hoped to be able to again establish a residence in Frederick, they 
had no place of residence there to which they could return. 
Id. at 842 43. The court‘s determinations thus turned on the availability of a physical dwelling, as 
opposed to habitation; a person need not have actually lived in the jurisdiction in order to be a resident, 
but he or she was required to have ―enjoyed the right to occupy the property on April 4, 1939.‖ Id. at 
842. 
 76. Coffey v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, 31 N.E.2d 588, 589 (Ill. 1940). 
 77. Id. at 589 90. This holding seems particularly relevant in light of the factual situation in 
Maksym because Rahm Emanuel permitted others to occupy his Chicago home while he lived in 
Washington, D.C. 
 78. Clark v. Quick, 36 N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ill. 1941). 
 79. Id. at 567 68. The Court apparently relied on the old common law rule that a wife‘s domicile 
was the same as her husband by operation of law, even if they had separated. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19, Comment A (1971). 
 80. Id. at 568. 
 81. Id. 
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married couple were not entitled to vote based on the location of the the 
wife‘s relative‘s house, though they intended to claim the town as their 
―home‖ despite inhabiting Terre Haute, Indiana.82 Another married couple 
were not residents of a town in which they had never lived.
83
 A 
―wandering farm hand‖ lacked any permanent abode.84 A transient worker 
was not eligible to vote based on a farm in which he held an unspecified 
interest and which was leased to another person, in spite of an arrangement 
permitting the worker to lodge there whenever he desired.
85
 Finally, a 
married couple had not lost their right to vote in the county where they 
kept their home, despite their two-month long absence from the county 
(and their dwelling) while the husband took a temporary job elsewhere.
86
 
Before the Illinois Supreme Court returned to the issue of what could 
constitute residence for election purposes, the state intermediate appellate 
courts addressed the issue several times. These cases involved voters or 
candidates who owned or rented multiple physical dwellings in different 
localities,
87
 and they all contain statements to the effect that a person‘s 
residence is determined by looking at his or her intent.
88
 This is because 
Illinois law only recognizes one residence for election purposes, so a 
person's intention controls where his or her ―permanent residence‖ is in 
situations where a candidate has multiple physical dwellings.
89
 These 
cases did not hold that intent alone controls residence; there was simply no 
dispute over whether the challenged voters or candidate had a physical 
dwelling in the electoral district. 
B. The Challenge to Rahm Emanuel’s Candidacy 
In 2010, Richard M. Daley, the longtime mayor of Chicago, announced 
that he would not stand again for election in 2011.
90
 In anticipation of the 
 
 
 82. Id. Unfortunately, it is difficult to elaborate on this holding because it is not clear what facts 
would have supported their claim that the relative‘s home was their own. There is nothing in the 
opinion to suggest that this couple intended to leave their own dwelling in Indiana.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 568 69. 
 85. Id. at 569. 
 86. Tuthill v. Rendleman, 56 N.E.2d 375, 385 86 (Ill. 1944). 
 87. See, e.g., People ex rel. Madigan v. Baumgartner, 823 N.E.2d 1144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); 
Walsh v. Cnty. Officers Electoral Bd., 642 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Dillavou v. Cnty. Officers 
Electoral Bd., 632 N.E.2d 1127 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 88. Id. at 1150; Walsh, 642 N.E.2d at 846; Dillavou, 632 N.E.2d at 1131. 
 89. See Baumgartner, 823 N.E.2d at 1151. 
 90. Douglas Belkin & Laura Meckler, Chicago Mayor Daley Won’t Run for Re-Election, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487043589045754779242561659 
14.html. 
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first seriously contested mayoral election in Chicago since 1989,
91
 twenty 
candidates filed to appear on the ballot.
92
 One of these candidates was 
Rahm Emanuel, a former representative of a Chicago district in the House 
of Representatives and the Chief of Staff for President Obama.
93
 Emanuel 
resigned his White House position and returned to Chicago in order to 
campaign for mayor.
94
 
Emanuel, who was born in Chicago, had owned a home in the city 
since 1998.
95
 He was elected to Congress in 2002, representing a Chicago 
district.
96
 He resigned his seat in early 2009 to join President Obama‘s 
staff.
97
 Between his resignation and May 2009, Emanuel lived in an 
apartment in Washington,
98
 but his family remained in Chicago.
99
 In June 
of that year, Emanuel‘s family joined him in Washington, where they took 
out a lease on a house that would last through June 2011.
100
 At the same 
time, Emanuel rented his Chicago home to another family, with that lease 
also running through June 2011.
101
 While Emanuel‘s family moved most 
of their everyday living items from the Chicago house to the Washington 
house, they left some of their property in the Chicago home.
102
 The 
Emanuel family lived in Washington until October 1, 2010, when 
 
 
 91. In his re-election campaigns, Daley garnered 70.7 percent of the vote in 1991, 60.1 percent in 
1995, 68.9 percent in 1999, 78.5 percent in 2003, and 71 percent in 2007. Richard M. Daley’s 22 Years 
as Mayor, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-04-30/news/ct-met-
daley-timeline-special-section20110430_1_45th-mayor-daley-pledges-richard-m-daley/1. As it turned 
out, Emanuel was also a popular choice among voters: he earned 55 percent of the vote against five 
other remaining candidates on election day. See Monica Davey & Emma Graves Fitzsimmons, 
Emanuel Triumphs in Chicago Mayoral Race, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/02/23/us/chicago-mayor-election.html. 
 92. Abdon M. Pallasch, 20 File to Run for Chicago Mayor, SOUTHTOWN STAR, Nov. 23, 2010, 
http://southtownstar.suntimes.com/news/2672142-418/filed-candidates-emanuel-monday-mayor.html. 
 93. Davey & Fitzsimmons, supra note 91. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Ill. 2011) [hereinafter Maksym 
II]. He purchased the house upon returning to Chicago after serving as an advisor to President Clinton. 
See About the Mayor, CITY CHI., http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/supp_info/about_ 
the_mayor.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2013) (noting that Rahm Emanuel served in the Clinton White 
House until 1998). 
 96. See Rahm Emanuel: Key Dates in the White House Chief of Staff’s Career, AP.ORG, 
http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/rahm_timeline/index.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2013). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1053. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1054. 
 102. Id. at 1053 54. This property included ―televisions, a piano, and a bed, as well as several 
personal possessions such as family heirlooms and books.‖ Id. at 1054. 
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Emanuel resigned his position as Chief of Staff and moved to an 
apartment in Chicago to run for mayor.
103
 
On November 26, a pair of Chicago residents filed a challenge to 
Emanuel‘s candidacy. Among other things, they alleged that Emanuel had 
lost his Chicago residency during his time as Chief of Staff and therefore 
could not meet the one-year residency requirement.
104
 With the election 
scheduled for February 22, 2011, the challenge wound its way through the 
legal system quickly. The Board of Election Commissioners of the City of 
Chicago ruled on December 23, 2010, that Emanuel was eligible.
105
 The 
challengers petitioned for judicial review in state court, where the trial-
level court affirmed the election board.
106
 The challengers then appealed to 
the Illinois Court of Appeals.
107
  
The challenge to Emanuel‘s eligibility was grounded in the provisions 
of two related Illinois statutes: the Municipal Code and the Election 
Code.
108
 Under the Municipal Code, ―[a] person is not eligible for an 
elective municipal office unless that person is a qualified elector of the 
municipality and has resided in the municipality at least one year next 
preceding the election.‖109 Under section 5/3-1 of the Election Code, a 
qualified elector includes ―[e]very person . . . who has resided in this State 
and in the election district 30 days next preceding any election therein.‖110 
The Election Code further defines residency in another section: ―A 
permanent abode is necessary to constitute a residence within the meaning 
of Section 3-1. No elector . . . shall be deemed to have lost his or her 
 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Kristen Mack, Rahm Emanuel’s Residency Challenged in Race for Mayor, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 26, 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-11-26/news/ct-met-rahm-residency-challenge-
20101126_1_residency-rules-ballot-challenge-lawyer-burt-odelson. The challengers in the court case 
were Walter P. Maksym, Jr., an attorney, and Thomas L. McMahon, a retired police officer. Id. The 
challengers, as well as several others, objected to Emanuel‘s candidacy on four grounds: (1) signatures 
on Emanuel‘s nominating papers were photocopies, not originals; (2) Emanuel did not make a timely 
financial disclosure, (3) Emanuel owed a debt to Chicago for not purchasing a vehicle sticker while 
supposedly a resident of the city though living in Washington; and (4) Emanuel failed to meet the 
durational residency requirement. See Report of the Hearing Officer at 11–24, Wohaldo v. Emanuel, 
No. 11-EB-MUN-1 (Chicago Bd. of Election Comm‘rs Dec. 22, 2010), available at http://www.chi 
cagoelections.com/dm/general/document_3224.PDF.  
 105. See Findings and Decision at 3–4, Maksym v. Emanuel, No. 11-EB-MUN-010 (Chicago Bd. 
of Election Comm‘rs Dec. 23, 2011). 
 106. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, No. 2010COEL020, 2011 WL 222521 (Cir. Ct. Ill. 
Cook Cnty. Jan. 4, 2011). 
 107. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, 942 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) [hereinafter 
Maksym I]. 
 108. Id. at 742–45. 
 109. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3.1-10-5(a) (West 2006). 
 110. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3-1 (West 2010).  
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residence in any precinct or election district in this State by reason of his 
or her absence on business of the United States . . . .‖111 
The objectors contended that Emanuel had lost his permanent abode by 
renting his Chicago home.
112
 The appellate court never reached that 
question. Instead, in a two-to-one decision, it held that Emanuel had lost 
his residence under the Election Code because he had inhabited 
Washington during part of the relevant one year time period, and that there 
were no statutory exceptions that could save his candidacy.
113
 
The first step in the majority‘s analysis was to determine what ―reside 
in‖ meant in the context of the Municipal Code.114 It noted that the Board 
of Elections had applied the same test for residency as used in determining 
voter qualifications, an approach consistent with prior appellate 
decisions.
115
 However, the majority found that no Illinois Supreme Court 
opinion had addressed whether the two codes used the same definition of 
―reside,‖ and that the only Illinois Supreme Court case addressing 
residency in the context of candidate eligibility, as opposed to voter 
eligibility, had been implicitly overruled.
116
 Having disposed of what was 
seemingly controlling precedent, the majority found that the meaning of 
―reside‖ in the Municipal Code was open to interpretation.117 The majority 
then endeavored to construe the statute.
118
 
The majority stated that the Municipal Code requires that a candidate 
meet two qualifications: he or she must be a qualified elector, and he or 
she must have ―resided in‖ the municipality for at least one year.119 It 
 
 
 111. Id. § 5/3-2(a). 
 112. See Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1069 (Ill. 2011) (Freeman, J., and Burke, J., concurring) 
(arguing that question raised by objectors was whether ―a person lose[s] his permanent abode if the 
abode is rented during the relevant residency period‖). 
 113. Maksym I, 942 N.E.2d at 749 51. 
 114. Id. at 743. 
 115. Id. at 743–44. 
 116. Id. at 744 (comparing Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie, 44 Ill. 16 (1867) (equating ―residence‖ 
with domicile) with Pope v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, 18 N.E.2d 214 (Ill. 1938) (holding that a 
permanent abode is necessary for ―residence‖)). The Municipal Code may supply the answer that the 
majority sought from case law: ―The general election law applies to the scheduling, manner of 
conducting, voting at, and contesting of municipal elections.‖ 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3.1-10-10 
(West 2006). This section would provide strong support for the proposition that the Municipal Code 
incorporates the Election Code‘s definition of ―reside in.‖ Curiously, the parties appear to have failed 
to bring this section to the court‘s attention; it is not discussed in the majority opinion or the dissent. 
Further, the majority explicitly rejected a line of intermediate court decisions treating ―reside in‖ as 
having the same meaning in both the Municipal and Election Codes. See Maksym I, 942 N.E.2d at 
743 44. 
 117. Id. at 745. 
 118. Id. at 745–51. 
 119. Id. at 747 (citing 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3.1-10-5(a) (West 2008)). 
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determined that Emanuel was a qualified elector under an exception in the 
Election Code for voters absent on the ―business of the United States,‖ and 
declined to address whether he was a resident of Chicago under the 
Election Code.
120
 It next considered whether Emanuel had resided in 
Chicago under the Municipal Code. 
Because the one-year durational residency requirement was stated 
separately from the requirement that a candidate be a qualified elector, the 
majority inferred that the Municipal Code‘s definition of ―reside‖ was 
different from the Election Code‘s.121 It found further support in an 
amendment to the Municipal Code, which provided that a soldier who ―is 
a resident of a municipality‖ then ―resides anywhere outside of the 
municipality‖ while on active duty, and then ―is again a resident of the 
municipality‖ immediately after coming off of active duty, will be deemed 
to have met the durational residency requirement of the Municipal 
Code.
122
 A floor speech by the sponsoring state senator indicated that the 
amendment was precipitated by a soldier returning home from Iraq who 
discovered that he was unable to run for office.
123
 From this, the majority 
concluded that in order to ―reside‖ in a municipality under the Municipal 
Code, a candidate must inhabit that municipality during the relevant time 
period; otherwise, it explained, the returning soldier amendment would 
have no effect because a returning soldier would have ―legal voting 
residence‖ in Illinois.124 After finding that Emanuel had lived in 
Washington, and that the ―business of the United States‖ exception applied 
only to electors, not candidates, the court disqualified Emanuel.
125
 
 
 
 120. Id. (citing 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/3-1, 3-2 (West 2008)). 
 121. Id. at 748. The majority did not consider what seems a more obvious explanation. The 
Election Code‘s durational residency requirement for electors involves a shorter time frame and 
different geographical unit than the Municipal Code‘s durational residency requirement for candidates, 
which makes it necessary for the Municipal Code to explicitly state the durational residency 
requirement, even if ―reside in‖ means the same thing in both statutes. 
 122. Id. (quoting 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3.1-10-5(d) (West 2008)). 
 123. Id. at 749 (quoting 95th Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Mar. 29, 2007, at 13 (Statements 
of Senator Luechtefeld)).  
 124. Id. at 749 50. The majority assumed, without explanation, that the returning soldier whose 
plight had motivated the amendment to the Municipal Code had maintained ―legal voting residence‖ 
but was nevertheless lawfully precluded from running for office. This is not an unreasonable 
assumption to make, but it ignores other possibilities: the anecdotal soldier may have lacked a 
permanent abode in his hometown, the soldier‘s application for candidacy may have been improperly 
rejected, or the soldier may have read the Municipal Code and concluded on his own that he could not 
run. 
 125. Id. at 750 51. In concluding that the ―business of the United States‖ exception applied only 
to electors, the majority again relied on the returning soldier amendment, reasoning that a returning 
soldier would have been absent on the business of the United States, and so the amendment must 
assume that the Election Code‘s exception does not apply to the Municipal Code. 
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The dissenting justice argued that Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie 
governed the dispute.
126
 Because Emanuel retained a clear intent to return 
to Chicago, she would have held that he did not abandon his Chicago 
residency while living in Washington.
127
 She accused the majority of 
creating ―a new and undefined standard for determining candidate 
residency requirements despite the plethora of clear, relevant and well-
established precedent that has been used by our circuit courts and election 
boards for decades.‖128 Characterizing the requirement that a candidate 
must inhabit the electoral jurisdiction as ―a figment of the majority‘s 
imagination‖ that it had ―conjured out of thin air,‖129 she lamented that the 
rule was ―unfair to the candidate, voters, and those of us who are charged 
with applying the law.‖130 
The appellate court‘s decision created practical problems. Before the 
Illinois Supreme Court could step in, the Chicago Board of Elections were 
faced with printing ballots without Emanuel‘s name, though the board 
chairman stated that adjustments could be made if the appellate court‘s 
decision was reversed.
131
 There was also concern that early voters would 
not know whether Emanuel would ultimately be declared eligible to stand 
for election.
132
 At the request of Emanuel, the Illinois Supreme Court 
swiftly accepted the case on appeal and stayed the appellate court‘s order 
to leave Emanuel off the ballot.
133
 It reversed the appellate court only two 
days later.
134
 
The majority opinion in the Illinois Supreme Court made clear at the 
outset how it felt about the appellate decision: ―Before proceeding to the 
merits, we wish to emphasize that, until just a few days ago, the governing 
law on this question had been settled in this State for going on 150 
years.‖135 It briefly examined the modern appellate-level decisions that had 
focused on whether a candidate had intended to abandon an old residence 
 
 
 126. Id. at 754 55 (Lampkin, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 752 53 (Lampkin, J., dissenting). The dissent‘s reasoning is largely the same as the 
Illinois Supreme Court‘s, which is discussed infra, Part II.B.3. 
 128. Maksym I, 942 N.E.2d at 754 (Lampkin, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 757 58 (Lampkin, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 758 (Lampkin, J., dissenting). 
 131. See Hal Dardick, Ballot Turmoil Hits at Bad Time; Emanuel’s Name Won’t Appear for Early 
Vote and Absentee Tallies, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 2011, at C9. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, 942 N.E.2d 450 (Ill. 2011) (order staying appellate 
court‘s order). The supreme court‘s order was issued the day after the appellate court‘s decision was 
rendered. 
 134. Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1066 (Ill. 2011). 
 135. Id. at 1057. 
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for a new one, then concluded that Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie had 
remained settled law until the appellate court decision just a few days 
before.
136
 
The court found that Smith controlled the case.
137
 The court noted that 
the language of the constitutional provision in Smith was virtually 
identical to the modern durational residency requirement.
138
 It affirmed 
Smith‘s holding that residency is established by a combination of physical 
presence and intent to make a place one‘s permanent home, which can 
then only be lost by abandonment.
139
 Applying the canon of statutory 
construction that a word with a settled legal meaning will be deemed to 
have that meaning, unless the legislature evinces a contrary intent, the 
court determined that the words ―reside in‖ used in section 3.1-10-5(a) of 
the Municipal Code incorporated the definition of ―residence‖ found in 
Smith.
140
 The majority thought that Smith, which had held that a state 
judge was an Illinois resident despite renting out his home and leaving the 
 
 
 136. Id. at 1058 (citing People ex rel. Madigan v. Baumgartner, 823 N.E.2d 1144 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005); Walsh v. Cnty. Officers Electoral Bd., 642 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Dillavou v. Cnty. 
Officers Electoral Bd., 632 N.E.2d 1127 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)). As explained supra, notes 87–89 and 
accompanying text, these cases focus on intent because they feature two possible dwelling spaces. The 
question originally presented in Maksym was whether Emanuel had lost his Chicago abode by leasing 
out his house. See Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1069 (Freeman, J., and Burke, J., concurring).  
 137. Id. at 1059 (citing Smith v. People ex rel. Frisbie, 44 Ill. 16 (1867)). For Smith‘s factual 
background, see supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 138. Id.; see also 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3.1-10-5(a) (West 2006). 
 139. Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1060. This test, of course, is the test for domicile, as pointed out by 
the concurrence. Id. at 1068 69 (Freeman, J., and Burke, J., concurring). The appellate court, in 
discussing Smith, had also noted that ―although the supreme court‘s discussion in Smith was based 
nominally on principles of ‗residence,‘ it appears from its analysis that it actually applied concepts of 
domicile.‖ Maksym I, 942 N.E.2d 739, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). The Illinois Supreme Court somewhat 
pithily characterized the appellate court as concluding ―that Smith is not binding because this court did 
not know what it was talking about when it wrote it.‖ Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1059. In fact, the 
appellate court thought that Smith had been implicitly overruled in other supreme court cases. See 
Maksym I, 942 N.E.2d at 744 (―Since Smith was decided, however, our supreme court has explained 
unequivocally that ‗it is elemental that domicile and residence are not synonymous.‘‖) (quoting Pope 
v. Bd. of Election Comm‘rs, 18 N.E.2d 214, 217 (Ill. 1938)). 
 140. Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1061. Evidence of such a contrary intent can be found in 65 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3-2(a) (West 2006), the statute providing that ―[a] permanent abode is 
necessary to constitute a residence.‖ In finding that Smith is still good law, the supreme court did not 
appear to consider the possibility that section 5/3-2 had changed the definition of ―residence‖ under 
Illinois law. Instead, the court seemed to think that because ―residence‖ and ―permanent abode‖ had 
been held to be synonymous, the definition of ―permanent abode‖ must be the same as the definition of 
―residence,‖ as articulated in Smith. See Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1061 62 (citing Pope, 18 N.E.2d 
214). The majority also criticized the appellate court for assigning different definitions of ―reside in‖ 
to the Municipal Code and the Election Code. Id. at 1062. The court pointed out that the candidate 
eligibility provision of the Municipal Code explicitly incorporated the voter eligibility provisions of 
the Electoral Code, so it would create an inconsistency within the Municipal Code itself to interpret 
―reside in‖ to mean different things for voter eligibility and candidate eligibility. See id. 
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state, refuted the objectors‘ argument that Emanuel lacked a permanent 
abode as a matter of law.
141
 The court upheld the Board‘s factual finding 
that Emanuel had not abandoned his Chicago residence, and was thus a 
resident of Chicago.
142
 
Two concurring justices believed that the majority wrongly equated 
residency with domicile.
143
 Arguing that prior Illinois Supreme Court 
cases had ―each define[d] residence in terms of domicile plus a permanent 
abode,‖ the concurrence felt that the majority had implicitly overruled its 
precedent.
144
 The concurrence‘s own analysis of Emanuel‘s residence 
consisted of only one paragraph at the conclusion of the opinion.
145
 It 
argued that Park v. Hood ―called into question‖ Smith‘s holding by 
requiring permanent abode for residence.
146
 However, it regarded the issue 
of whether rental of a home caused it to be lost as a permanent abode as an 
open question.
147
 Citing a policy favoring ballot access, the concurring 
justices would have resolved the case in favor of allowing Emanuel on the 
ballot.
148
 
The Illinois Supreme Court‘s decision was warmly received by the 
same newspapers that had criticized the appellate court‘s ruling days 
before. The Chicago Tribune was happy to be able to ―focus on the 
mayoral candidates‘ actual qualifications for office,‖ agreeing with 
Emanuel that ―‗[w]hat the Supreme Court decided today is that voters will 
make [the] decision.‘‖149 The Chicago Sun-Times praised the decision as 
―a victory for the voters, who deserve the right to decide for themselves 
who their next mayor will be.‖150 Emanuel went on to win the election 
easily, avoiding a runoff by winning a majority on the first ballot.
151
 
 
 
 141. Id. at 1066. 
 142. Id. 
 143. ―The majority today now makes clear that residency for all purposes is the equivalent of 
domicile.‖ Id. at 1067 (Freeman, J., and Burke, J., concurring) (citing Pope, 18 N.E.2d 214; Park v. 
Hood, 27 N.E.2d 838 (Ill. 1940); Clark v. Quick, 36 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. 1941)). 
 144. Id. ―The majority, therefore, should overrule those portions of Pope, Park, and Clark which 
hold to the contrary.‖ Id. Strangely, the concurrence never cites to section 5/3-2(a) of the Election 
Code, which is the source of the permanent abode requirement in those cases. The supreme court 
would presumably be without power to ―overrule‖ the permanent abode requirement because it was a 
legislative enactment whose validity was unchallenged.  
 145. See id. at 1069.  
 146. Id.; see also supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 147. Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1069 (Freeman, J., and Burke, J., concurring). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Editorial, And Now, the Election, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 2011, at C20 (quoting Rahm Emanuel). 
 150. Editorial, Emanuel Ruling a Victory for Democracy, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, at 29 
(characterizing the decision as ―[c]ommon sense and the law [having] a meeting of the minds‖). 
 151. John Chase & Rick Pearson, Mayor Emanuel; Presidential Advisor Avoids Runoff with 55%, 
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23, 2011, at C1. 
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III. PROBLEMS ILLUSTRATED BY MAKSYM 
Maksym is a marvelous case study in the various dangers posed to 
courts by durational residence requirements, and not just because of the 
widely divergent opinions or the mistakes in reasoning that arguably 
resulted from the expedited timeframe under which the Illinois Supreme 
Court was forced to issue its decision. The episode provoked a significant 
response from the Chicago media and was a topic of civic discourse 
throughout the city, and elsewhere. Of course, this is not an uncommon 
feature of election law decisions involving candidates for public office; as 
part and parcel of the campaign story, media exposure and commentary is 
a given. However, the intense media coverage surrounding Maksym is 
particularly notable because it triggered a debate not just about the 
motivations of the judges involved in deciding the case at each level 
(which many did call into question), but about the wisdom of durational 
residence requirements at all, particularly those that would be enforced by, 
in the case of Illinois, an elected judiciary.
152
 Maksym thus generated 
instantaneous commentary by non-lawyers and non-academics about the 
very legitimacy of courts, an effect quite similar to what was seen in the 
aftermath of Bush v. Gore.
153
 
This part of the Note discusses three specific but interrelated problems 
on display during the course of the Rahm Emanuel case. The first problem 
is the inherent tension between protecting voter choice and promoting the 
rule of law when interpreting and enforcing a candidate qualification rule. 
The second problem is the strain that candidate qualification litigation puts 
on courts by requiring rapid decisions in areas of law that may be complex 
and worthy of additional time for judges to study. These two problems 
have to do with difficulties faced by courts in resolving the legal issue. 
The third problem is the risk posed to judicial legitimacy by the existence 
of the two previously-identified problems, as well as by the unavoidable 
necessity of making a decision that at least some voters will assume was 
motivated by extralegal considerations.  
A. The Question of Voter Choice 
A candidate qualification restriction is something of a philosophical 
curiosity because it would seem that the purpose of a popular election is to 
permit a majority (or, in some cases, a plurality) of voters to select a 
 
 
 152. See ILL. CONST. ART. VI, § 12. 
 153. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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candidate whom they believe is the most qualified individual interested in 
a particular office. Theoretically, candidate qualifications are unnecessary 
because voters can judge for themselves the best candidate, affording 
appropriate weight to any fact that could be the subject of a candidate 
qualification law—and a durational residence requirement can block the 
most popular candidate.
154
 A world in which no qualifications are placed 
on candidates for political office seems unlikely; however, the notion that 
voters should be permitted to judge the merits of candidates themselves is 
reflected in the democracy canon, a rule of statutory construction that 
favors ballot access in order to enable greater voter choice.
155
 
On the other hand, if we assume that legislative institutions function as 
intended, then the existence of the candidate restriction is itself an exercise 
of popular will. Whether a candidate qualification is contained in a 
constitution or a statute, it is a judgment made by the people‘s 
representatives and alterable (though perhaps with some difficulty) by 
those representatives. A durational residence requirement could be 
justified as being necessary to prevent some voters from being placed into 
a situation where they have to hold their nose to vote for a carpetbagger 
candidate who is a better match for their political views over an 
ideologically incompatible opponent. Particularly where there is no reason 
to think that a candidate qualification restriction will favor one faction 
over the other in the long-term,
156
 there is merit in respecting the wishes of 
the people, as articulated through the legislative process. 
The Makysm majority did not overtly apply the democracy canon, but 
arguably departed from its own precedent in a way that furthered the 
policy goals of increased voter choice.
157
 The majority instead cast its 
holding as a straightforward application of law that ―had been settled . . . 
for going on 150 years.‖158 The concurrence, meanwhile, invoked a 
corrolary to the democracy canon to resolve the question of whether a 
rented-out home could constitute a permanent abode in favor of ballot 
 
 
 154. E.g., Lawrence v. City of Issaquah, 524 P.2d 1347 (Wash. 1974) (rejecting constitutional 
challenge by a winning candidate who was blocked from taking office by a one-year residence 
requirement). 
 155. See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 76 (2009).  
 156. See Chad Flanders, Election Law Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1369, 1378 87 
(2012). 
 157. See Hasen, supra note 155, at 92 96 (describing the democracy canon as a substantive rule 
rather than an interpretive rule); see also infra Part III.B.  
 158. Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Ill. 2011). 
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access, its establishment in prior Illinois case law making its invocation 
more legitimate.
159
 
In contrast, the majority in the appellate court was assailed—both by 
the dissenting judge and in the press—for ―disenfranchis[ing]‖ those 
voters who favored Emanuel‘s candidacy.160 Though this criticism was 
leveled after the fact, it would be difficult to believe that the judges in the 
majority were unaware that their result was contrary to the principles 
underlying the democracy canon. For those who do not doubt the honest 
motivations of the Illinois Appellate Court majority,
161
 the decision of that 
court struck the balance in the other direction, favoring what it believed 
was required by the statute over the substantive consequence of restricting 
ballot access for one candidate. 
Whether or not the democracy canon is desirable,
162
 its purposes seem 
sufficiently obvious that any court required to decide whether to keep a 
candidate on the ballot could be forced to choose between applying the 
law as the court sees it and rendering a decision in order to further a 
democratic policy of ballot access. While the necessity of making difficult 
decisions should not in and of itself preclude judicial consideration of such 
questions,
163
 it is an unfortunate result of any election litigation pitting a 
legal barrier against a candidate‘s ability to access the ballot, a theme 
running throughout the Emanuel challenge. 
B. The Difficulty of Rapid Decision-Making 
The Maksym decision demonstrates another common feature of 
election litigation: the necessity that a court make a decision 
expeditiously.
164
 When the Illinois Supreme Court took up Maksym, the 
 
 
 159. Id. at 1069 (Freeman, J., and Burke, J., concurring) (―[A] candidate‘s access to the ballot is 
favored by law.‖) (citing McGuire v. Nogaj, 496 N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). 
 160. Maksym I, 942 N.E.2d 739, 758 (Ill. 2011) (Lampkin, J., dissenting); Editorial, Rahm Ruling 
a Disservice to Voters, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, at 21 (quoting the dissent) [hereinafter Rahm 
Ruling]. 
 161. See, e.g., Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1067 (Freeman, J., and Burke, J., concurring) (―That 
court did the best it could without the benefit of a supreme court opinion which clarified the 
standards.‖). 
 162. See Hasen, supra note, at 106 13 (responding to the argument that the availability of the 
democracy canon increases the flexibility of judges to make outcome-determinative decisions in 
election law cases). 
 163. A point made in the Bush v. Gore per curiam opinion: ―When contending parties invoke the 
process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the . . . issues the 
judicial system has been forced to confront.‖ 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). 
 164. See id. (reviewing a decision made only three days prior); id. at 100 02 (describing the 
cramped procedural history of the case). 
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election was less than a month away
165—close enough in time that election 
officials felt that they could not afford to wait to print ballots pending the 
court‘s decision.166 Moreover, both early voting and absentee voting were 
soon to be underway, so the lack of a final decision on Emanuel‘s status 
meant that voters interested in casting ballots for him could not be certain 
that their vote would count.
167
  
Courts facing time-sensitive election litigation may lack the ―time for 
reflection, study, or debate‖ necessary to resolve difficult legal issues.168 
The Maksym court lacked that time, a factor that arguably impaired its 
analysis.
169
 Although the majority spends a good deal of space picking 
apart the misguided decision of the appellate court,
170
 it includes only brief 
analysis of almost a century and a half of precedent,
171
 analysis that does 
little to illuminate the challengers‘ argument that the Illinois durational 
residence law required candidates (and voters) to maintain a physical 
dwelling in the election jurisdiction. 
This lack of analysis is regrettable. For the reasons discussed in Part II, 
it is difficult to square Maksym with those cases under which the existence 
of a dwelling within the jurisdiction was determinative.
172
 It is possible 
that the court assumed that the portions of Park and Pope apparently 
requiring candidates and voters to have access to a physical dwelling were 
satisfied by even a rented-out home. But if that was the case, the court 
should have said so. It seems likely that this light analysis was a function 
of the necessity of quickly reversing a damaging lower court decision, 
always a risk in election litigation because it is impractical to simply stay 
the election until the court has had ample time to consider its decision.  
 
 
 165. Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1053. 
 166. Dardick, supra note 131 (describing how ballots were soon to be printed despite the 
pendency of the case in the Illinois Supreme Court). 
 167. See id. 
 168. See Michael Herz, The Supreme Court in Real Time: Haste, Waste, and Bush v. Gore, 35 
AKRON L. REV. 185, 190 (2002).  
 169. Cf. id. at 191 n.32 (noting that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park v. Volpe is thought to ―contain[] several universally acknowledged blunders,‖ and acknowledging 
the argument that those blunders were the result of an expedited hearing schedule) (citing Peter L. 
Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions 
Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1265 66 & n.45 (1992)). 
 170. See Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1062 64. 
 171. See id. at 1058 (one paragraph); id. at 1060 61 (two paragraphs). 
 172. See supra notes 60–75 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Risk of Institutional Damage to Courts 
On their own, these two problems are concerning. However, the 
internal difficulties faced by courts asked to determine the meaning of a 
durational residence requirement are augmented by the external threat 
posed to the courts by the appearance of making a decision based on 
partisan political considerations. The tension between the rule of law and 
voter choice inherently places a court‘s legitimacy into question because it 
pits the democratic process against its result. No matter who wins the case, 
the court must rule against one democratic principle or the other, opening 
it to criticism for undermining democratic choice. The short timeframes, 
which risk poorly reasoned decisions, exacerbate this problem by making 
it more difficult for the court to persuasively justify a correct decision and 
by increasing the likelihood of making an incorrect one. The court thus 
becomes a participant in the election as opposed to a neutral arbiter.
173
 
On top of the delegitimizing impact of the previously identified 
problems, the fact that the court knows how its decision will affect a 
particular candidate and his or her rivals means that the court is open to 
charges of political bias no matter what decision it delivers. The criticism 
surrounding Maksym—and in particular the response to the appellate 
court‘s decision to knock Emanuel off the ballot—are illustrative. 
The appellate court‘s decision drew swift and negative responses from 
Chicago‘s two major newspapers. ―With startling arrogance and 
audaciously twisted reasoning, two appellate judges ignored more than 
100 years of legal precedent, invented a new definition of ‗residency‘ and 
ordered Rahm Emanuel off the . . . mayoral ballot,‖ raged the Chicago 
Tribune.
174
 The Chicago Sun-Times wrote a more subdued response to the 
court‘s decision, supporting the dissenting justice‘s point that ―[s]triking 
Rahm Emanuel‘s name from the ballot for mayor of Chicago unfairly 
‗disenfranchises . . . every voter in Chicago who would consider voting for 
him.‘‖175 
The language in both newspapers attacks not merely the legal basis of 
the appellate decision, but also its legitimacy. The Chicago Tribune‘s 
editorial in particular, by referring to ―twisted reasoning‖ and the ignoring 
 
 
 173. See Herz, supra note 168, at 186. 
 174. Editorial, Judicial Arrogance, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 25, 2011, at C14 [hereinafter Judicial 
Arrogance]. 
 175. Rahm Ruling, supra note 160 (quoting Maksym I, 942 N.E.2d 739, 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) 
(omissions in original)). 
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of precedent, walked the path of implication right to the edge of an 
outright charge of intentional disregard for the law.
176
 Though the Chicago 
Sun-Times editorial used less inflammatory language, it too called into 
question the legitimacy of the appellate court‘s decision by suggesting that 
potential Emanuel voters had not merely been denied one choice, but had 
been disenfranchised—that is, lost their right to vote entirely.177  
Though reinforcing the norm of democratic choice, the Illinois 
Supreme Court‘s decision was likewise open to criticism. The concurrence 
criticized the majority and the appellate court dissenter for being 
unnecessarily harsh on the appellate majority.
178
 The concurring justices 
believed that the dissenting appellate judge had ―accused the majority of 
basing its decision on something other than the law‖ and that ―[t]he tone 
taken by the majority today, and the refusal to acknowledge conflicting 
case law, unfairly perpetuates that notion.‖179 This, the concurrence 
argued, ―cross[ed] the line‖: ―Inflammatory accusations serve only to 
damage the integrity of the judiciary and lessen the trust which the public 
places in judicial opinions.‖180 The incendiary rhetoric on display in the 
opinions from Maksym has also been noted by commentators.
181
 
An additional problem existed because Illinois judges are elected in 
partisan elections, prompting further concerns about the ability of the 
courts to impartially decide the dispute.
182
 Moreover, one justice on the 
Illinois Supreme Court, Anne Burke, was married to Chicago alderman Ed 
Burke, a prominent supporter of one of Emanuel‘s rivals.183 
The Illinois courts appear to have emerged relatively unscathed, but 
episodes such as the Rahm Emanuel residence challenge chip away at the 
perceived legitimacy of judicial decisions. This generation of controversial 
litigation is an unavoidable byproduct of election law, but given the risk 
that such litigation will damage courts‘ legitimacy, it would be preferable 
 
 
 176. See Judicial Arrogance, supra note 174. 
 177. See Rahm Ruling, supra note 160 
 178. See Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1067 68 (Freeman, J., and Burke, J., concurring). The 
concurrence argued that the Illinois Supreme Court‘s own caselaw contained ―conflicting 
pronouncements on the question of residency,‖ so it was unfair to criticize the appellate court for not 
following Smith. Id. at 1067.  
 179. Id. at 1067 68. 
 180. Id. at 1068. The concurrence also noted that the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Sun-Times 
had picked up on the dissenting judge‘s insinuations of bias, and had also heavily criticized the 
appellate decision. Id.; see also supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 181. See Joshua A. Douglas, Election Law and Civil Discourse: The Promise of ADR, 27 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 291, 294 96 (2012); Robert E. Shapiro, Is “Sanity” Enough?, 37 LITIG. 57 (2011). 
 182. See Rick Pearson & David Kidwell, Specter of Politics Hangs Over Ruling; Justices Who 
Will Decide Emanuel’s Ballot Fate All Have Strong Party Ties, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 2011, at C1.  
 183. Id. 
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to avoid placing the fate of elections in courts when it is not strictly 
necessary to do so. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Having identified several problems with durational residence 
requirements on display in the Emanuel case, the question becomes what, 
if anything, can be done in an effort to ameliorate those problems. 
The elimination of durational residence requirements would be one 
way to solve the problems they pose for courts. Despite the rational 
relation of durational residence requirements to legitimate state 
interests,
184
 these interests are not terribly strong in light of the electorate‘s 
ability to examine, on a case-by-case basis, the political qualifications of a 
particular candidate. There is no durational residence requirement for 
federal congressional elections, only a requirement that senators and 
representatives be inhabitants of the state at the time of their election.
185
 
Consequently, the length of a candidate‘s residence has been a campaign 
issue in senate elections involving Robert F. Kennedy and Hillary Clinton 
in New York,
186
 and Alan Keyes in Illinois.
187
 Presumably, the voters in 
those elections were aware of the controversy surrounding the candidates‘ 
short terms of residence, but evaluated that fact along with other relevant 
factors and voted accordingly. The harms that would come from 
eliminating durational residence requirements—essentially, the likelihood 
of a serious candidacy by a candidate insufficiently connected with the 
electorate—are balanced by the fact that it is that same electorate which 
will ultimately pass judgment through the election itself. 
 
 
 184. See Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1218 19 (D.N.H. 1973) (three-judge panel) 
(Campbell, J., concurring), summarily aff’d, 414 U.S. 802 (1973). 
 185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. § 3, cl. 3. The Constitution does impose a durational national 
citizenship requirement. See supra note 3. 
 186. Kennedy won election to the Senate from New York in 1964 despite not even being a 
qualified New York voter. Adam Nagourney, In a Kennedy’s Legacy, Lessons and Pitfalls for Hillary 
Clinton; Carpetbagger Issue Has Echoes of ’64, But Differences Could Prove Crucial, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 10, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/10/nyregion/kennedy-s-legacy-lessons-pitfalls-for-
hillary-clinton-carpetbagger-issue-has.html?pagewanted=all. Clinton faced accusations of carpetbagging 
when she ran for the senate from New York in 2000. Id. She won anyway. See JEFF TRANDAHL, 
STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 7, 2000, at 43 
(2001), available at http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/2000election.pdf. 
 187. See, e.g., Rick Pearson, Keyes, State GOP Gearing Up Blame Campaign, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 
2004, at C6 (referencing the carpetbagger controversy that occurred during Alan Keyes‘s 2004 Senate 
campaign against Barack Obama). 
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Nevertheless, as it seems unlikely that durational residence 
requirements will disappear anytime soon, there are ways in which 
legislators can alter or clarify local requirements in order to protect courts 
from difficult situations. The first and most important step that a state 
legislature could take would be to clarify precisely what is meant by the 
statutory term ―residence.‖ Illinois is not the only state in which ―the only 
thing that is well established . . . is the confusion that has existed on this 
subject.‖188 All of the concerns discussed in Part III are implicated when 
the meaning of the residence requirement is unclear. A lack of clarity 
introduces the tension between the democracy canon and the rule of law 
by not specifying a straightforward rule which courts should apply to 
specific cases, and makes it difficult for any court to determine the precise 
meaning of ancient and arcane cases within the short timeframes 
necessitated by election litigation. Unclear law also opens a court‘s 
decision—whatever it may be—to the criticism that, because the law could 
have been interpreted differently, the judge‘s partisan political preferences 
must have played a role in their decision. Clarification of the law—even if 
that clarification would, in its operation, cut against the policy of 
promoting voter choice—would avoid these problems. Clarification would 
also promote predictability, something of importance to both candidates 
and voters. 
Some potential paths that a state could take are mentioned briefly in 
Part I. The pure domicile test, which would require only durational 
domicile, has been proposed as the ideal test because it serves the goals of 
durational residence requirements, permits potential candidates to gain 
knowledge and experience outside of their home jurisdiction, and tends 
not to be overly restrictive, thus serving the policy of voter choice.
189
  
The problem with the pure domicile test is that it relies on an intent 
element, which is a fact-intensive inquiry.
190
 Consequently, virtually any 
candidate who had spent serious time in a different election jurisdiction for 
work, study, or similar obligations would be open to arguments that he or 
she had abandoned their domicile. This opens the door to courts or 
election boards (whose factual determinations may be reviewed only 
deferentially),
191
 to manipulate factual findings or analyses in order to 
 
 
 188. Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d 1051, 1067 (Freeman, J., and Burke, J., concurring). 
 189. E.g., Meredith, supra note 28, at 223 24. 
 190. See generally 39 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 2d 587, §§ 9 28 (1984) (describing a variety of 
ways in which domicile can be proven or disproven). 
 191. E.g. Maksym II, 950 N.E.2d at 1064 (applying ―clearly erroneous‖ standard to election 
board‘s factual determinations). 
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achieve favorable results. Even if a court does not do this, the fact that it 
has the opportunity to manipulate factual findings creates a risk that 
aggrieved candidates and their supporters would believe the decision is 
illegitimate. 
Some of these concerns would be greatly reduced through the use of 
bright-line rules that would enhance predictability with very little cost to 
the policies animating the domicile test‘s focus on intent. For example, a 
rule where maintained voter registration was conclusive on a person‘s 
intent not to abandon a former domicile would make it easy for persons 
wishing to retain their legal connection with their ―home‖ jurisdiction, 
while at the same time protecting that jurisdiction from the candidacies of 
those who had been politically active elsewhere. 
Other potential rules could focus on a physical dwelling. An easy rule 
would be to simply require that the candidate own or lease residential 
property within the election district during the statutory period. This rule 
sacrifices a close fit to the purposes of residence requirements in the 
interest of clarity: it permits foreigners to purchase residence through the 
mere rental of an apartment, while excluding persons who have 
temporarily left home intending to soon return but lacking the financial 
resources to maintain a residence. 
Alternatively, a state could require candidates to have actually 
inhabited the election jurisdiction for a certain period of the time in the 
past. Such a rule would exclude potential candidates who lack a previous 
connection to the election district, while at the same time including former 
inhabitants who wish to return home and run for office. A dwelling 
requirement, durational or not, could be used to ensure that the candidate 
maintains a present connection to the jurisdiction, whether or not he or she 
lived there. 
Creative legislators or lawyers could come up with a variety of 
different ideas that could serve the purposes of durational residence 
requirements without subjecting courts to the difficult decisions that they 
are often forced to make under existing laws. The choice of any of these 
options would, however, be preferable in a jurisdiction where uncertainty 
prevails. Ambiguous residence rules lead to difficult questions for courts, 
fail to afford courts ample time to wade through those difficult questions, 
and ultimately undercut the legitimacy of any decision that those courts 
might make. Illinois is lucky that the Maksym court allowed Rahm 
Emanuel on the ballot. Had the challengers prevailed, it could have 
torpedoed the political credibility of the state courts, even if that decision 
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were reached through legal reasoning and analysis as opposed to partisan 
political preference. State legislatures should take steps to protect their 
courts from the risks posed by unclear durational residence requirements. 
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